members of the Upper House were left to be nominated by the Governor, or the Ministry, these members would probably all be appointed from within a radius of a few miles from Perth. Such was the case now with nominated members in the present House; they were all what might be called town members. With a nominated Upper Chamber the country districts would have no show at all, and for that reason he would be strongly opposed to a House of nominees.

MR. LAYMAN thought if it was considered advisable to provide obstruction in the shape of a second Chamber, it did not matter much whether it was a nominated or an elected Chamber. There certainly was one advantage in having an elected Upper House, over one that is nominated. It would be made up of members from all parts of the colony—whereas, if nominated, it would probably consist of appointments from Perth, Fremantle, and the immediately surrounding districts, the country districts being entirely left out of it.

MR. SCOTT said he should support his hon. friend on his right. He was in favor of an elected House because he thought the principle that the people should govern themselves was, to a great extent, a good principle; and he thought when, as regards the Upper House, they would have a different franchise and a different property qualification from what they would have for the Lower House, it would bring into force two elements that would probably view things from a different standby; and it was well that people should not all look at matters from one point of view only. He thought it would be better for us to begin with our new constitution as we intended to continue in it; and not be constantly making changes, and unsettling the public mind. He did not believe in always tinkering with the constitution of a country. He was not at all in accord with the suggestion of the hon. member for Wellington, that we should begin with a nominated Upper House, and, some years hence, when the population had increased, go in for an elected Upper House. He thought the chances would be that we should have a more Radical chamber then than if we adopted the elective system now with our present conservative population. Although the hon. member for Toodyay appeared to think that there were men who would not care to contest an election for the Upper House any more than an election for a Lower House, he thought the hon. member would find he was wrong in that, and that with a higher franchise and a higher property qualification, an election to the Upper House would not be such an excitable affair as a contest for a seat in the Lower House.

MR. PEARSE said he had always held the opinion that whenever the present constitution was changed for one of two Houses, both Houses should have their members chosen by the people, and not nominated by the Governor; and he had heard nothing in the course of the debate that evening to induce him to change that opinion.

The amendment of the hon. member for Wellington was then put, and negatived on the voices; and the original resolution affirmed.

Progress was then reported, and leave given to sit again on Thursday, March 29th.

Thursday, 29th March, 1888.

RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT: MR. PARKER'S RESOLUTIONS.

ADJOURNED DEBATE.

MR. PARKER moved the 6th resolution standing in his name, as follows: "That in view of persistent differences of "opinion disclosing themselves between "the Legislative Chambers, it is highly "desirable that definite provision should "be made for peaceable and final settle-"ment of disputes, and, at the same time, "for preserving the co-ordinate powers "and equal authority of the two Houses "in the passing of laws." It would be remembered, he said, that the Governor in his despatch to the Secretary of State, writing upon the subject of avoiding

deadlocks between the two chambers, said: "I would strongly advise that the "Legislative Council have power to reject "anything of the nature of a 'tack,' or "item involving some political measure to "which the Upper House object, added "to a money bill by the House of Assem- "bly, which should have power, however, "but only by a two-thirds majority, and, "after an interval of at least eight "months, to pass and send to the Gover- "nor, without consent of the Legislative "Council, a separate bill containing the "measure objected to. This method"—His Excellency added—"of obviating a "deadlock has been suggested by high "authority, and I would propose to "adopt it in Western Australia." That was the Governor's proposal. When he referred to it in the remarks with which he prefaced his resolutions, when introducing them generally, he stated that this proposal, at first sight, appeared a radical one; but, he thought, if they looked at it more carefully, they would find there was nothing very objectionable about it. The first question they had to consider was whether it was necessary we should have any such provision for settling serious differences between the two Houses, or not. It had been found, in the other colonies—and especially in Victoria—that deadlocks did occur between their two chambers. On one occasion, for instance, in Victoria, on the question of payment of members, the House of Assembly having passed a Bill through all its stages, authorising the payment of members, the Legislative Council rejected the measure. The House of Assembly then tacked on to the Estimates or Appropriation Bill a certain sum for the payment of members. This, also, was rejected, and a deadlock arose. They knew that in consequence of that deadlock, which continued for some months, a great deal of disaster, and he might also say ruin, overtook many persons. In fact, it came to such a pass that when Sir Michael Hicks-Beach refused to interfere, except as a last resort, Mr. Berry in the Legislative Assembly said, "What does the Secretary of State desire: Does he desire to see this fair city in ashes—broken heads and flaming houses?" It was not for some time afterwards that a compromise was arrived at, and things resumed their ordinary course. In Queensland, a similar deadlock arose, but that was happily settled. The Legislative Council there took the view that they had the right to amend the Appropriation Act, and did so by striking out £7,000, which had been added to the Bill for the payment of members. On this matter being referred to the Privy Council, they decided that the Legislative Council had no power to amend a money bill—that they must pass it or reject it as it stood. The deadlock thus was of very short duration. It was for the purpose of avoiding any similar deadlock in this colony that it had been suggested that they should have the means of settling disputes without the fear of any such disaster as had threatened Victoria. The suggestion of the Governor was not claimed to be original; he believed it had been proposed in the first instance in Victoria by Mr. Service, who, he presumed, was the "high authority" referred to by His Excellency in his despatch. It appeared to him, after looking at it more closely, to be a simple method of getting out of a difficulty; and it was not so radical a measure as one might think at first blush, when it was borne in mind that a simple majority would not be sufficient to enable the Assembly to adopt the extreme course referred to, of passing a separate bill, without the consent of the other House. This could only be done by a two-thirds majority. They all recognised that the will of the people must eventually prevail, and that the object of a second House was to retard hasty legislation rather than to assume a hostile attitude towards the popular Chamber. They all recognised that the main object of an Upper House was not to interpose obstacles in the way of legislation, but—by preventing the passing of a measure which they considered injurious to the public interests—to give the people an opportunity of reconsidering the measure, as passed by their representatives in the Assembly. This they would be able to do under the proposed system of settling differences between the two Houses, for it would be observed that it was only after an interval of eight months—during which there would be ample time for the voice of the country to be heard—that the Assembly could adopt the extreme course here proposed,

and then not by a bare majority, but by a two-thirds majority of its members. When they came to consider this, he did not think the proposal was such a radical proposal as it had appeared to him on cursorily glancing at it. Other means of preventing deadlocks had been suggested; but, on the whole, he could not help thinking that this suggestion made by Mr. Service was the best one which had been brought to his notice. His resolution, however, did not commit the House to adopt this method of avoiding deadlocks; the resolution simply affirmed the desirability of providing some means for doing so.

MR. VENN said he intended to move that this proposal be struck out. The hon. member for Perth had not shown to him, or to the House, that there was any special reason for this particular innovation—he used the word "innovation" advisedly, for so the proposal had been characterised by the Secretary of State in his despatch to the Governor. He did not think the hon. member had shown them sufficient reason why they should adopt such a radical measure. Perhaps he was wrong in saying "radical measure," inasmuch as the hon. member in his resolution suggested no measure at all, but simply said that in the event of persistent differences arising between the two Houses, it was highly necessary to make provision for a final settlement of the disputes, and, at the same time, for preserving the co-ordinate powers of the two Houses. What did that amount to? It was simply asking the Secretary of State to do something which no one had been able to do in any other Legislature of two Houses in the past. It was asking the Secretary of State to introduce into our Constitution Act that which it had not been considered advisable to introduce into any other Constitution Act before. When His Excellency made the proposal which the hon. member referred to, what did the Secretary of State say in reply? He said: "I think, "indeed, the colony would, in the end, "derive more benefit by working out its "own future at the risk of some friction "from time to time, than by adopting "so great an innovation of principle." Then he added: "The effect of such "a provision as you suggest can only "be conjectured, but I should much "doubt whether it would tend to secure "the peace of the colony, or to diminish "the number of disputes between the "two Houses." After all, these disputes were rare. We could only point to isolated instances throughout the colonies; and, if, on the whole, the peace of those colonies was preserved without any such powers as were here proposed to be given to the Lower House, he thought we might venture to follow on the same lines. He saw no necessity for breaking this fresh ground at all. It was a difficult problem to deal with, one which had puzzled some of the wisest statesmen, and the nearest solution, perhaps, was something in the way suggested by Mr. Service. But there was another way which commended itself to his mind as being rather better than the plan proposed by Mr. Service, and he thought would prove an easier solution, and that was this: that, in the event of a dispute between the two Houses having reached its extreme point, and then only, the Houses should sit together. He should be glad indeed if anyone could suggest a way out of the difficulty, but no way had yet been found in other countries. He had discussed the question with some of the most eminent statesmen in the other colonies, and they could offer you no definite suggestion; they all thought that when they came to analyse the thing it had better be left alone—let things remain as they are. As he had already said, he did not think it would be advisable to break fresh ground in this colony, and to seek to solve a difficulty which had puzzled the wisest statesmen. He would therefore propose that this resolution be omitted.

THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (Sir T. C. Campbell) said the simplest course would be for the hon. member to vote against the resolution when it was put.

MR. RICHARDSON did not know that he was altogether in accord with the resolution; it appeared to him very vague and very indefinite. Except that they were told that it referred to a proposal submitted to the Secretary of State by the Governor, there was nothing to indicate to the Secretary of State, or anyone else, what was proposed to be done. He thought there was one feature in the scheme referred to which would work a

great deal of mischief—this waiting for eight months before a dispute between the two Houses could be settled. During these eight months the whole financial affairs of the colony must be at a standstill, and he could see that a great many evils might ensue, and the country be torn by dissension. He thought if the proposed remedy could be made more prompt in its action it would be an improvement. The principle involved in the resolution itself was right enough—that it was desirable there should be some means of avoiding deadlocks between the two Houses; but the difficulty was to find out how this could be done. Certainly the resolution itself was rather indefinite. It appeared an extreme measure to take to allow one chamber to pass a measure, without the other's voice being allowed to be heard at all. It must be remembered that one reason why the House of Lords was allowed no voice in many matters was the fact that it was not a representative assembly— and he thought a very forcible reason too. But having passed a resolution that our own Upper House was to be a House of elected representatives, many of the reasons for forbidding its voice being heard in such matters of dispute fell to the ground. It appeared to him that this proposal virtually placed it in the power of the Lower House to silence the voice of the Upper House whenever it liked. It left it open for them to say, "Oh, we have only got to hang out this eight months, and then the other chamber is out of it." So that, although the scheme settled the difficulty it did so simply by ignoring and virtually snuffing out the Upper House—a House, be it remembered, elected by the people, and representing a very important section of the community, those probably who had the greatest stake in the colony. There might be practical difficulties in the way of the hon. member for Wellington's proposal—that the two Houses should sit together to settle their dispute—but he was rather inclined to think, viewing the matter from a common sense point of view, it was a better suggestion than that of the hon. member for Perth. The two-thirds majority was no doubt a redeeming feature in that suggestion, but it did not get over the delay of eight months, during which the affairs of the country would be paralysed. Nor did it do away with the fact that the practical result of the remedy proposed would be to utterly ignore the voice of the Upper House, and for the time being to abolish a chamber elected by a very important portion of the community. He thought if that chamber had the confidence of the country and represented a large proportion of the intelligence of the colony, as it probably would, it was entitled to have a continuous voice in the legislation of the country, and a continuous voice even in financial matters, because, after all, these financial questions might be the most important questions that could come before any Legislature. The proposal seemed to him to offer an actual inducement to the Lower House to stick out, inasmuch as it would know that, after the lapse of a certain time, the voice of the other House would be silenced.

Mr. PARKER said he might point out to the hon. member for the North, and to the hon. member for Wellington, that the resolution as proposed did not profess to provide any particular method of solving the difficulty. It was merely a general proposition, to the effect that it was highly desirable some method of solving the difficulty should be found. He had merely suggested Mr. Service's scheme. The resolution itself was merely general, so that, in the event of the House affirming it, it would be quite competent for them hereafter to introduce a provision in our Constitution Act that, in certain cases, the two Houses should sit together and settle their difficulties. He had no wish to commit the House to the solution that had commended itself to him. All he asked the House to affirm was a mere abstract proposition, which he should imagine no one would gainsay.

Mr. HENSMAN said it had been pointed out that the resolution was perfectly general in its terms. It seemed to suggest that, as disputes between the two Houses were likely to arise, it was for somebody else and not for that Council to suggest those means which it was desirable should be adopted for settling these disputes. The position of affairs was this: the Governor had suggested a method of doing so in his despatch to the Secretary of State, and, in due course, the Secretary of State had written back a despatch to the Governor, saying he did not approve of his

method, that he thought it would not work, and asking him to submit the matter to that Council. If that Council merely sent back a resolution stating that no doubt it was desirable to do something — which everyone agreed — to prevent these evils, they simply left the matter where it stood. Why did they not go on and point out what they desired should be done? He objected to leaving all these arrangements to be settled by the Governor's observations on one side and the Secretary of State's observations on the other. He thought that the Governor's despatch on this question of Responsible Government had done a great deal of harm. The more we pointed out ourselves what we wanted, and the less we left it to others to put the case for us, the better it would be. He thought the suggestions put forward by the Governor in his despatch as to the question of separation, and as to the protection of the aborigines, and as to other matters, had thrown back the question of Responsible Government considerably. It was for that House to settle the question itself, and it should not be decided for them by the Governor and the Secretary tary of State. If there was to be a controversy between that House and the Secretary of State or the English Government, let the arguments and the reasons of that House be set forth and not the arguments of somebody else. If they were to trust to the arguments of some third party they should get very little forwarder in this matter. Their own arguments were likely to be much more powerful and much more effective than if they left the matter to be argued for them by the Governor. His objection to the present resolution was that in itself it suggested nothing. It was really a platitude. It said it was desirable to adopt some means of preventing mischief in the future between the two Chambers of the Legislature. Was it worth while for that House to pass a resolution to that effect? It seemed to him that this resolution sought to put it to somebody else to suggest how to avoid this mischief. He had not heard any arguments more strong in support of a single Chamber than some of the hon. member's arguments, or in support of the proposition that, if there are to be two bodies of men, they should sit together in one Chamber. They knew there had been no deadlocks here up to the present time, no scenes or collisions between any two parties in that House. There had been divisions of opinion, no doubt, but no deadlocks and no collisions. In Victoria, it seemed, where they had their two chambers, they had been led nearly to a revolution. There had been disputes between the two Houses in Queensland, which had to be referred home before they could be settled. We were now seeking, in this resolution, to suggest that these difficulties should be avoided, that these deadlocks between the two Houses should be prevented—we did not say how. He did not think himself that where there were two legislative chambers it was possible to remove these difficulties. They were bound to arise under a system of two chambers. And, if this colony adopted that system, all we could do was to look to the Secretary of State, who had given us his own suggestions on the subject. "I think, indeed," he said, "that the colony would in the end derive more benefit by working out its own future at the risk of some friction, from time to time, than by adopting"—what? "By adopting so great an innovation of principle as that advised by you"—the Governor—"in the 16th paragraph of the despatch now under consideration." If he were in favor of two Houses at all, he should be inclined to agree with the Secretary of State rather than with the Governor. He would not be in favor of setting up an Upper House to knock it down again. He would not be in favor of having in one of these chambers a body of what he might call political eunuchs. If they were going to have a second Chamber, and this second Chamber was to consist of the wisest, or the most practical, or the most cautious men amongst them, he should say let these wise, and practical, and cautious men have their fair share in the passing of laws. He could not imagine that any man of independence would submit to belong to a chamber where he was not in a position of equal importance, of equal independence, and where he had not an equal liberty to express, and, if necessary, to enforce his convictions, as if he belonged to the other chamber. But another proposal had been put forward. The hon. mem-

ber for Wellington proposed that, in the event of friction rising between the two Houses, the two bodies should sit together. Do let him ask, if that was to be the remedy—do let him ask, if it would be well that these two bodies should sit together sometimes, why not always? Do let him ask hon. members to give them some arguments, why, if it was desirable when difficulties arose and when friction occurred, you should bring the two bodies together, why, he asked, should they not sit together when there was peace and harmony between them? He hoped the hon. members of that House were not so fixed in their opinions that they were not open to argument; but when the people of the colony came to think of these things, when they had before them the arguments of those who were in favor of two chambers, but who having seen the serious difficulties which arose in the other colonies from a collision between the two chambers, and who, foreseeing the same difficulties here, suggested that when these difficulties did arise the two Houses should sit together, so as to get rid of their difficulties—when the people of this colony heard these things would not they come to the conclusion that it would be better for these two bodies to be always sitting together, so as to avert these difficulties, to prevent these dangers, as they had done in that House for the last seventeen years? He really regretted that some of these arguments were not used last night in support of the single chamber system. With regard to the resolution itself, there was nothing to be said about it. Everybody must agree with the abstract principle laid down. It certainly said nothing to convince the Secretary of State that his views on the subject were wrong—and he would remind the House that we had now entered the argumentative stage of this question of Responsible Government, it was now a controversy between the Secretary of State and this colony. He thought we had passed this stage long ago, when we passed those two resolutions last July. Now we were simply arguing the question of separation and other matters, when we decided last session that there should be no separation. It appeared to him we had now arrived at a stage which might possibly be prolonged for at least another year, with despatches going backwards and forwards between Downing Street and Government House. This was most unsatisfactory, and he regretted that the cause of Responsible Government in this colony should have got to this stage at last.

MR. VENN said there was a great difference between two Chambers sitting together always and sitting together to settle some extraordinary difficulty which may have arisen between them,—a difficulty which could only be overcome by a conference of the two bodies. The two positions were so totally different that the want of analogy must suggest itself to the hon. member. This had only been suggested as a remedy in the case of an extreme deadlock. But he did agree with the hon. member that it was not wise at this stage to raise this controversy. If we had any decided opinion on the matter he should have been more pleased if these resolutions had given a more definite expression to those opinions. He should have been more pleased if this particular resolution had stated what we did desire, instead of leaving it to somebody else to decide for us. It was always best to decide for ourselves than leave others to decide for us on all those questions which so directly concerned ourselves.

MR. SHENTON said he felt inclined to move that this clause be struck out, for he thought the same objection held good in this case as to the proposition of the Secretary of State that we should have but one Chamber. None of the other colonies had attempted to solve this difficulty, and it was not for this colony to enter upon political experiments in the shape of a single Chamber, or in providing a remedy for deadlocks. This colony was not in a position to have any experiments tried upon its Constitution. The Secretary of State told them he did not view the proposal of the Governor with favor, "involving as it did"—to use his own words—"a depar-"ture from the fundamental principle of "Parliamentary Government, where two "Houses exist." We wanted to make no departure from fundamental principles. All we wanted was to obtain the same safeguards in working our Constitution as the other colonies of Aus-

tralia possessed. If these difficulties did arise, we must endeavor to get over them the best way we could. As the Secretary of State said: "The occasional but tem- "porary inconvenience of a deadlock be- "tween the two Houses, great as it is at "the time, may work its own cure, by "inducing a spirit of moderation and "mutual concession on the next occasion "of a dispute." Instead of anticipating difficulties, and meeting troubles half way, it would be much better for us to wait until these difficulties arose, and be content in the meantime with the same safeguards as were provided by the constitutions of the other colonies.

MR. SCOTT thought it would be a great deal better to leave the resolution out altogether. He thought it would be wiser to trust to a spirit of mutual concession between the two chambers. As the Secretary of State pointed out, the effect of the scheme which had been suggested for settling the difficulty was only problematical, and, with the Secretary of State, he much doubted whether it would tend to secure the peace of the colony. It certainly would tend to diminish the respect of the people for their Upper House, and he did not think it would be wise to encourage that feeling.

MR. MARMION thought, if they suggested the necessity for overcoming these difficulties, they ought to point out how it was to be done. If they called attention to the evil he thought they ought to suggest a remedy. He thought, instead of sending a mere abstract proposition like this, something in this shape would meet the case: "That this Council is in accord with the Right Honorable the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the views expressed by him in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of his Despatch No. 3, of January 3, 1888, to His Excellency the Governor, and considers that, under the proposed Constitution, the two Houses should 'have co-ordinate powers and equal authority in the passing of laws,' thus following 'the precedents of older communities.'" He thought that would answer the purpose better than the present resolution, and he would move it as an amendment. He was quite in accord with the expression of opinion contained in the clauses referred to. He thought with the Secretary of State that the colony in the end would derive more benefit by working out its own future at the risk of some little occasional friction between the two branches of the Legislature, than by having recourse to the drastic remedy which had been suggested. If the Upper House had to consent to the proposed suppression of its rights, even although only temporarily, it must suffer a loss of dignity, and cause it to be looked down upon. In fact, it would be disgraced in the eyes of the people, and he thought that was a most humiliating position to place any legislative assembly in. As to the other suggestion, that the two Houses should sit together when a deadlock ensued between them, he agreed with what had fallen from the hon. member for Greenough on that point. If this was the remedy suggested for the cure of a certain disease which might attack the body politic, he failed to see why they should not adopt the old principle, "Prevention is better than cure." Let the two bodies sit together at all times, and not sit together only when they got at loggerheads. One section might still be elected on a higher franchise than the other, and that would have the same class of men exercising the franchise as if they were electing these members for a separate House. Surely, the mere putting them in a different room would not make wiser or better men of them, or make them fitter to exercise a beneficial influence upon the legislation of their country. The House, however, had thought proper to pass a resolution in favor of two chambers, and they now had to meet the difficulty suggested in the resolution. He failed to see why we should deviate from the course followed by our neighbors, or, in the words of the Secretary of State, "depart from the fundamental principle of Parliamentary Government where two Houses existed, namely, that they shall have co-ordinate powers and equal authority in the passing of laws." After all, these deadlocks were of very rare occurrence, and he would sooner trust to the good sense of the House to adjust their differences, than to any experimental scheme for arbitrarily disposing of them, by degrading one House and exalting the other in the eyes of the people. He hoped the amendment he had submitted would commend itself to the committee.

MR. PARKER said he was no way wedded to this resolution of his, for, as he had already said, it appeared to him when he first looked at the proposed remedy that it was rather a radical proposal to make. At the same time, he might point out that, in all the other colonies, their leading statesmen had always suggested that it would be advisable to have some provision to prevent these deadlocks. Of course the difficulty there was to be found in the fact that they already had a constitution, which made no such provision, and it would be very difficult now to change these constitutions, or remodel them, in such a way as to avoid these collisions between the two branches of the Legislature. But here we had not yet framed our constitution, and the reason he had brought forward the resolution was with the view of seeing whether it might not be possible to make such a provision in our new constitution, from its initiation. He could not help thinking that if the colony of Victoria had an opportunity of remodelling her constitution, or frame a new one, the statesmen there would be in favor of making some provision for avoiding deadlocks. But he had no intention of pressing the resolution upon the House, although, as he had already said, it was a mere abstract proposition.

MR. RICHARDSON hoped the resolution would not be withdrawn altogether, without some record being left that the House considered it would be desirable that some provision should be made, if possible, to meet this difficulty. What that provision might be would be a subject for further consideration when the Constitution Bill came before them. He did not think it was a logical argument, that because the other colonies had not adopted this safeguard, neither should we. Many years had elapsed since the constitutions of the other colonies were framed, and they may not then have realised the necessity of making this provision. Now that the defects of these constitutions had been revealed, he thought it would be well for us to endeavor to profit by their experience, and to provide against any defects which the working of the constitutions of the other colonies had brought into light. He thought we should endeavor to take advantage of any lesson which the past had taught our neighbors, rather than slavishly copy them in every detail. He thought the argument that because it might be a good thing on certain extraordinary occasions, or under certain extraordinary circumstances, to have the two Houses sitting together, it must necessarily follow that it would be a good thing to have them always sitting together, was unworthy of consideration. It might as well be argued that because people called in a doctor, when they were suffering from disease, and he cured them, they should be always calling in the doctor, whether they were well or not. He was still of opinion—and the result of this discussion had confirmed it—that the suggestion of the hon. member for Wellington was the better one of the two; at any rate, it commended itself to him as about the best way to get over the difficulty—that the two Houses should meet in one chamber to discuss any serious point of difference, amounting to a deadlock. In that way we should have each branch of the Legislature having its proper rights respected, and the voice of each would be heard.

MR. HENSMAN said the resolution seemed to him self-contradictory. It assumed that a certain state of things might occur, that there might be a fixed and persistent difference of opinion—not a mere temporary difference, but a fixed and persistent dispute between two parties; and how were you going to settle it without one of the parties giving way? If so, they could not (in the words of the amendment) have "co-ordinate powers and equal authority." Two Houses could not have equal authority when, in case of a dispute, one was obliged to give way to the other. The Secretary of State was clearly of this opinion, when he regarded the Governor's proposal as "a departure from the fundamental principles of Parliamentary Government." He thought the views of the Secretary of State would commend themselves to that House rather than those of the Governor, upon which the debate appeared to have gone, so far; and our desire was, not (to use a common phrase) to set up the back of the Secretary of State more than we could help, but—inasmuch as a difference of opinion had arisen—to try to see where we could agree with him. The Secre-

tary of State had invited our views; he wanted us, in fact, to give some arguments which might convince him, and inasmuch as the resolution embodied no argument, and suggested no way out of the difficulty, he failed to see what was the good of it. As they had not seen the amendment in print, he would move that progress be reported, and leave given to sit again.

MR. PARKER thought it was hardly necessary to report progress, as he did not object to the amendment. He would point out that it was highly desirable these resolutions should be placed in the hands of the Governor at the earliest possible date.

The motion to report progress was agreed to.

Friday, April 6th, 1888.

RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT: MR. PARKER'S RESOLUTIONS.

ADJOURNED DEBATE.

On the Order of the Day for the further consideration of the resolutions, the amendment submitted by Mr. MARMION in the course of the previous debate was put and passed, without further discussion.

MR. PARKER then moved the 7th resolution standing in his name—"That no ground whatever of necessity has been shown for placing the interests of the aboriginal population in the hands of a body independent of the local Ministry." The House, no doubt, remembered the words that the Governor used in his despatch to the Secretary of State, when dealing with this question. His Excellency pointed out that at present we have a Board, known as the Aborigines Protection Board, established under an Act passed by the Legislature; and the idea of the Governor was that this Board should continue to exist under Responsible Government, but independently of the Ministry of the day. His Excellency proposed that an annual sum of £5,000 should be set apart for the use of this Board, to be expended for the benefit of the native population. The Governor also suggested that a portion of this money should go towards the maintenance of the Revenue cutter, employed in connection with the pearl shell fishery on the North-West coast, where a considerable number of these natives were employed. As a set-off to this charge of £5,000, the Governor's idea was that the ordinary Estimates be relieved of a portion of the vote for the Aboriginal Department, and relieved of a part of the cost of maintaining the Revenue cutter. We were at present expending about £3,000 a year for the protection of aborigines, under the direction of the Board referred to, and the annual grant for the maintenance of the Revenue cutter was £2,000; so that, if the Governor's views were carried out, there would be no great additional expense entailed. But it appeared to him—and he thought they would find it out in the course of this debate—that the Governor was not altogether in accord with the members of that House, or rather that the members of that House were not altogether in accord with the Governor, as to the necessity of vesting this money in the Aborigines Protection Board, independently of the Ministry of the day, or of Parliament. There was no reason to suppose that the natives had been badly treated in the past, or that they were likely to be treated badly in the future. He did not suppose there was another colony where the natives were so well treated as they were here, and especially at the North. Of course there may have been a few exceptions, there may have been a few cases of ill-treatment, as was bound to occur in any community; but, on the whole, no one could say that the natives of this colony had been badly used by the settlers. It was to the interest of the settlers and of the pearlers who employed these natives to treat them well. Latterly, he was sorry to say, owing to the stringent regulations which had been passed by that House, governing the relations of these employers and the natives, a great many of